The General rules of interpretation contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties do not only apply to treaties; they also apply to the constitutions of International Organizations. This paper argues that a textual application of the VCLT that interprets an IO’s constitution “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context” without applying an extended teleological approach to the constitution’s “object and purpose” compromises its ability to behave as an organization with values and practices that reflect contemporary expectations of accountability. An extended teleological approach to constitutional interpretation is the extension of the doctrine of implied powers to implied obligations, which are obligations that can be necessarily implied from an IO's constitution where there is a close connection between the obligation and one or more of its generic functions or institutional purpose.
Border controls have been described as the last bastion of sovereignty. The emerging European integrated border management (IBM) challenges this assumption.
The hallmark of the IBM is its technocratic and depoliticised logic. Various state and non-state actors cooperate in a complex dynamic of securization. In addition, technological advancements are contributing to change the traditional practices of border controls. These evolutions not only puts to test the relation between territory, power, and political control but also require a different understanding of the responsibility ensuing from the exercise power and control in the management of EU borders.
This paper aims to address the question of the responsibility for human rights violations that these practices can trigger. The underlying theoretical question concerns the way in which international responsibility can be conceived where borders are managed by supranational institutions and legitimized in a post-national fashion.
This article examines the manner in which the rise of populism affects the use of international law by domestic courts. It argues that populism may have a negative effect on the willingness of domestic courts to refer to international law. It further argues that although such response is understandable, it is regrettable, since incorporation of international law into domestic court rulings can serve as a counter-populism measure.
Maintaining international law as part of the domestic legal discourse is particularly important in a populist setting, for two reasons. First, where constitutionalism is overtaken by populists, international law can serve as an important source on which courts can draw to protect human rights. In addition, referral, analysis and application of international law are means of maintaining pluralism in legal and public debate and, accordingly, of enhancing democracy.