Public planning as an administrative function has been neglected in legal studies in recent years. The gap is due to the fact that there was a movement of ascent of the institute in the XX century, with its link to the Welfare State, and its subsequent fall, at the end of the century, in as a consequence of the prevalence of liberal ideals. The fall, however, did not imply in its disappearance. The hypothesis defended in this work, therefore, is that the administrative function of state planning, under the lens of the 21st century, lends itself to the rationalization of public action and leads to innovation. In this context, planning is inserted as a stage of the public policy cycle, focused on the economic-social development of the State, and structured through norms defining plans and policies. Law, planning and development comprise a triangular relationship of complementation, allowing the interaction of legal and extra juridical elements in the conduct of administrative action.
This paper explores the concept of the economic constitution as it was developed in the Weimar Republic by Hugo Sinzheimer and Franz Neumann as a way to democratize the level of economic production by putting an end to the “anarchy” of economic freedom and by providing “the possibility of some form of state and social intervention into the natural course of economic activity, that is, into the condition of economic freedom” (Franz Neumann). Moreover, it shows the complementarity between the Weimar political constitution and its economic constitution.
After this analysis, the paper asks whether we should conceive social rights constitutionalism through the concept of the economic constitution and whether this would be helpful in protecting both the economic/social and the political constitution against the “total market thinking”- as Alain Supiot has put it- that prevails in the EU.
Ten years ago, the Euro-crisis had deep consequences on the economies and quality of life. The crisis also had an impact on the constitutional texts of several countries in the EU through the incorporation of different kinds of constitutional balanced budget clauses and other budgetary constraints. This trend is not new; before the European experience, most states in the US had similar clauses in their constitutions. Now, this has extended beyond Europe to several countries which have amended their constitutions in line with this trend.
The paper will briefly describe the current debate regarding these clauses, focusing on the experiences of Germany, Spain, Colombia, and Brazil. Then, it’ll analyze the efficacy as well as the positive and negative aspects of this constitutional trend. Finally, it’ll conclude that these reforms have some risks if they are not accompanied by the establishment of rules and institutions necessary to maintain a healthy fiscal policy.
The theme of economic freedoms and crisis governance points to the wider issue of state intervention in the economy. In France in particular, the 20th century was marked by State domination of the economy at the expense of freedom. However, in a way, the 21st century has given birth to a more even balance of power between the State and the market. Indeed, economic freedoms appear as a crisis prevention tool which the public authorities have a duty to protect, in their role as a regulatory State.
Eurasian Economic Union is an International Organisation of regional international integration that has international legal personality and established by the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union concluded May 29th, 2014 in Astana, Kazakhstan.
The Law of the EAEU consists of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union; international treaties within the EAEU; international treaties of the EAEU with a third party; decisions and dispositions of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, and the Eurasian Economic Commission adopted within their powers.
According to the Treaty on the EAEU the Court is a permanent judicial body of the Eurasian Economic Union.
Applicants to the Court: Member States, Bodies of the EAEU, Economic entities of the EAEU Member-States and third States, Employees of the Bodies of the EAEU, Individual entrepreneurs.
Part I of the paper analyses the relationship between domestic systems and transnational economic actors adopting a legal pluralist framework. It argues that the human rights responsibilities of transnational enterprises and economic regimes must be understood as an internalization/institutionalization of socio-political demands – possibly conveyed by State systems – by the legal systems of transnational economic actors. Part II develops these analyses using ‘constitutional resistance’ doctrines as a case study. It argues that instruments such as the Calvo and the ‘constitutional substitution’ doctrines, distinctive of Latin-American constitutionalism, may be used towards the sources through which transnational systems flow, namely international economic law. Such use of ‘constitutional resistance’ doctrines could be an effective instrument of ius-generation, inducing significant changes in the structures/processes of economic globalization.