Consensual public administration has become a new facet of the Brazilian Public Administration. Once characterized by the way of acting based on rigidity and one-sidedness, now the new conception of the Administration is endowed with a participatory and democratic bias. In addition to the mandates of the Federal Constitution for the peaceful settlement of disputes, there are notable normative reforms, such as the new Code of Civil Procedure, which benefit the overcoming adversarial mentality in which they aim to insert in the administrative arena the consensual solution of conflicts through negotiation, mediation, conciliation, term of adjustment of management or conduct and use of unnamed techniques. The new paradigm of Public Administration tends to adjust to the demands of modern society, in order to be able to provide efficient management, based on mechanisms governance and decision-making processes with democratic participation, based on the logic of consensus.
A global trend to establish specialized intellectual property (IP) courts can be observed. Consensus exists that IP courts can be important for improving quality, coherence and speed of the dispute resolution process. However, such specialized courts are criticized because of the risk of isolation and their pro-patent bias. Therefore, the institutional design of such specialized IP courts is vital for generating “trust”. The objective of this paper is to examine the interdisciplinary trust literature and to propose a conceptualization of trust that could contribute to the debate about specialized courts. The paper first maps the main features of the future “Unified Patent Court” (UPC) as a case study. Then it provides a comparative analysis of specialized IP courts resulting in insights in measures that can be used to build trust in the UPC. This may ultimately trigger the “leap of faith” (Möllering, 2007) that is required to stimulate collaboration with such new judicial actors.
International economic law imposes limits on policy spaces. But scholars rarely study empirically the interpretive acts that determine the accepted meaning of investment or trade law as applied to a specific regulation long before a formal dispute. To fill this gap, we focus on interpretive contests over the meaning of WTO law between corporations and bureaucrats and their implications for states’ policy space. Based on a case study of Chile’s landmark 2015 nutrition labeling regulation and drawing on documents from freedom-of-information requests as well as interviews, we make two arguments. First, superior resources and a favorable global institutional environment enable transnational corporations to directly assert self-interested interpretations of international law to social regulators worldwide. Second, national bureaucrats can only refute these business-friendly interpretations and claim policy space by drawing on relevant expertise, in-house or through inter-agency cooperation.
Independent agencies (hereinafter as “IA”) are found in countries with different government designs. This symbolizes a worldwide trend to adjust the traditional mechanism of separation of powers.
Most countries with IA are facing governance issues in different degree. For example, Taiwan FTC’s settlement with an enterprise overturned whole communication policy direction without any participation of other agencies.
I will define whether the IA to be functionally or organizationally independent, externally or internally independent, and independent in a general or case-by-case sense at first. I suggest different goal-settings of independence would affect institutional designs of IA, and institutions such as staggered terms are not necessary under the goal to keep IA from the head of government.
Finally, I contend the key to a feasible governance of IA is in Congress. Except for reviewing IA nominee’s competency, it may reserve the final decision powers in the head of government.
Investors settle where conditions (wages, tax, …) would make them the most competitive. However, globalisation has lead the States to reshape their regulations to encourage investments. States compete with each other also through their judiciary. Investors are paying attention to the effectiveness and the quality of the judicial system of a chosen State of settlement. In Europe, Brexit gave a new kick to this phenomenon. Some States are now creating ad hoc domestic English-speaking Courts for international commercial disputes to lure corporations, allowing them to benefit from a legitimate court but with looser procedures. In Belgium, the Brussels international Business Court will be established and will follow arbitration procedures. It is ironic for a country that almost teared down the CETA negotiations because of an ISDS clause. Our paper addresses the tension between this dynamic and the notion of sovereignty, and a shift from an independent judiciary to a hybrid justice system.
Globalisation, the development of transnational law and strengthening of the position of private entities enforce changes in the approach towards the government: in order to support its legitimization and build trust for the state it is necessary to shift from government to governance. The concept implies that significant redistribution of political power, combined with enhancing the presence of non-governmental organisations, epistemic communities, “networked structures” and public-private partnerships, plays a role in improving the efficiency of the state and international organisations. In our paper we examine how does the concept of good governance has been implemented in the regulatory framework provided by the General Data Protection Regulation. The reason for choosing this example is the fact that it has an impact on all of the dimensions of reality: public and individual, business and citizens, political life and everyday life.