The aim of the my paper is presentation of the institution of organic
law in the system of sources of law in selected European countries.
In my paper I want to present the assumptions of the institution of
organic laws from the perspective of the system of sources of
universally binding law and with reference to values and standards
characteristic of a modern democratic state. The paper is also
aimed at presenting of the lawmaker’s approaches to the institution
of organic law in the following European countries: France,
Germany and Poland. At the same time, I want to formulate initial
de lege ferenda postulates addressed to the lawmaker and
concerning the institution of organic laws in the above-mentioned
European countries (considered from the perspective of the system
of sources of universally binding law).
This paper contends that judges are generally disinclined for institutional reasons to clearly articulate reasons for decisions on the core distributive dilemmas that are inevitably raised by constitutional property rights. This leads to doctrinal ambiguity, particularly in respect of: a) what distribution of collective burdens is susceptible to invalidation pursuant to such guarantees; b) when compensation might be required to legitimise restrictions.
Such ambiguity leads to regulatory inertia and supports political cultures that over-inflate the strength of constitutional protection for property rights. Given the chilling effect that constitutional property rights have on legislative changes that interfere with property rights, the paper argues for a more sceptical assessment of the value of constitutional property rights as an alternative to the dominant scholarly approach of reinterpreting constitutional property doctrine in a more progressive direction.
Today democracy is under pressure due to the presence of private subjects involved into the decision-making process. The authoritative powers are conferred to private entities, which intervene in decision-making not so much as consulted stakeholders, but as negotiators on an equal status with the States. The law loses the voluntary and authoritative features to acquire those of the ‘autopoietic’ and ‘reflexive’ private law .The margination of the political decision maker boosts the crisis of the political representation and exemption of private entities from responsibility. The combination between public and private sector crosses technological innovation from the Internet to biotechnology. This multifaceted and intertwined phenomenon has its landing point in the new forms of accountability and in the challenge between technique and politics.
Social effect of constitution always shows real power of the document, how it works in practice and what is its impact on society. This is always linked to the question of legitimation and the will of the people, as they are main source of political power. Georgian constitutional reforms are known to be designed by concrete politicians according to their political or sometimes very individual taste. Mostly, constitutional commissions are just fiction and the text is written “somewhere in the dark cabinet”.
This paper aims to underline basic directions of Georgian constitution-making process, analyze impact of constitutional legitimation on the perception of the basic law and how to measure the will of the people in the constitutional law-making process. It will be focused on the Georgian experience and basic challenges for the Georgian constitution.
In contemporary armed conflicts States’ armed forces are deployed not only to conduct hostilities against the enemy but also to engage in activities other than military confrontation, such as police operations. If a party to a conflict engages in hostilities, it is obliged to conduct them in accordance with the paradigm of hostilities and to comply with regulations set forth in the law of armed conflict, and if the actions of that party take the form of a police operation, then one should refer to the law enforcement paradigm based on human rights. This text explains that these two paradigms are different in fundamental ways. While complementary, law of armed conflict and human rights law differ in the way in which they regulate the use of lethal force because of the different circumstances in which they were designed to apply: armed conflict and peacetime. This text presents also key definitional elements of both paradigms and indicates when and how they interplay.