This work seeks to deal with the privacy of the public agent from the point of view of the State’s protection, aiming to discuss the extent which the veil of private life can be mitigated in the name of the public interest, particularly if considered agents who work in sensitive activities, such as public security, intelligence and anti-corruption. In order to do so, our analysis starts from a special justification of the legal relation between the State and its agents: the special subjection relations, originally found in nineteenth-century German law and developed in the current doctrine of Spanish-speaking countries, as well (with lower academic production) in Brazil. On the basis of such relationships, a greater intensity is justified in the legal relationship between the State and its agents when compared to the bond established with its citizens in general. Thus, we seek to conclude whether a greater restriction on the privacy of state agents is possible.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have always been an issue for national legislators. Their regulation is conflicted between liberalization on the one hand and the need for public affairs to have more stringent rules on the other. Despite this difficulty, however, SOEs play an important role in the market, especially in key public services (thanks to which States are able to retain control of a sizeable part of their domestic economy). This paper examines the problems relating to the regulation of SOEs, especially considering that good governance of SOEs is critical to ensuring a positive contribution to the efficiency and competitiveness of national and international economies. Moreover, when the State plays the role of market regulator and competitor in a domestic market, it is essential to guarantee fair competition and a level playing field between the SOEs and private enterprises.
Some specialized tribunals with jurisdiction over economic regulation are empowered to dictate general measures on economic sectors, thus regulating directly through rulings that usually originate in adversarial proceedings. This offers a chance to evaluate the convenience of using proceedings with the form of a trial for regulatory ends.
This paper explores the following possible procedural advantages of such a system: (i) affected parties could provide relevant arguments or data in support of their preferred policy and refute the positions of others in a public discussion; (ii) this process might prove to be more transparent and subject to stronger control from affected parties than when the administration regulates; and (iii) the rationale behind a chosen policy might also be better explained and justified in the ruling than it usually is when administrative agencies establish or modify economic regulations.
The analysis is focused on the national blockade of truckers which strongly affected Brazil between 21 and 31 May 2018, and its direct repercussions on the regulatory agency’s behavior. To solve this crisis, significant part of the government’s bargaining involved the participation of the National Agency of Terrestrial Transport (ANTT), which was responsible for the regulation of the minimal pricing policy for freight transportation throughout the country. However, the highly unstable regulations adopted by the Agency in just a few days have demonstrated the fragile autonomy of the entity, as well as revealed its de facto quasi-regulatory performance. The same perspective seems applicable to other Brazilian agencies, when analyzed the aggressive institutional pattern adopted by the Presidency, the Ministry and the Judiciary on regulatory issues, in order to weaken the agencies’ independence and legitimacy.
Many jurisdictions are witnessing significant growth in regulations concerning the lobbying of politicians in government and parliament. While lobbying is central to democracy, it is available mainly to those with significant resources and is often the most effective means of influence. Unchecked, it corrodes trust in public institutions. This paper argues that transparency regimes are inadequate for dealing with the underlying concerns surrounding lobbying. An analysis of those regulations reveals three problems. First, the laws often lead to little meaningful transparency. Second, there is little political will for supporting lobbying regulators. Third, the current regulations ignore other approaches that might be more effective in restoring public trust. Thus, ideas are mooted for a new approach to regulation which accounts for the nuances inherent in insidious forms of corruption common to lobbying practices.
My paper describes the class actions’ mechanism and the activities of the Class Action Fund in Israel, while analyzing its broader normative and theoretical applications and its “contribution” to the erosion of the distinction between public and private law, as well its relationship with the phenomenon of corporate human rights responsibility. The Israeli Fund finances class actions that have “public and social importance” in regards to their submission, and is almost a world precedent, and therefore can be seen as a kind of “laboratory” for some of the normative issues that can be used in other legal systems. In addition, the article discusses the connection between class actions and the international discourse on human rights and corporations – led by the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework in the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business Human Rights and the 2014 “Accountability and Remedy Project” initiative.