This paper centres on the idea that a 21st century constitution is not a 20th constitution, but nor is it a 22nd century constitution either. We live in an increasingly global, digital, and unequal world that is facing environmental ruin. There is a view that a 21st century constitution should include ecocentrism, happiness, and the promotion of economies of care and of meaning, and that it should reflect local and regional needs, as well as provide for a more inclusive society. We must have an eye to the present and scrutinise how it delineates from what came before, but also anticipate the future. This paper seeks to provide an overview as to what the concept of a 21st century constitution might entail in this context, with reference to Chile
How can we allow for ongoing constitutional definition and intergenerational communication going forward so as to clarify what the extent of these needs?
Territorial arrangement and territorial politics are among of those important issues which should be covered by all “good” constitutions. In fact, all constitutions of federal countries have special chapters regulate statuses of subjects of those federations as well as relationships between federal and local levels. Constitutions of unitary states also have clear regulations about territorial arrangement.
The Constitution of Georgia have some ambiguousness in this regard:
First of all, from this constitution is not clear model of territorial arrangement of this country. In fact, Georgia is an unitary state with two autonomies, but the constitution also has norms distinctive just for federal constitutions;
Secondly, there are some gaps regarding Abkhazian Autonomous Republic and occupied territories of Georgia.
The aim of this paper is to present and analyze the shortcomings of the Constitution of Georgia regarding territorial politics in the context of a good constitution.
The modern constitution incorporates a nationalist idea of the foreigner as a problem, and what should we do with them? Somewhat, constitutions are also designed to protect the state against foreigners. A crucial step for a homogenous and universal state is to rethink the meaning of membership and minorities—the currently constitutional design strengths the national identity element. The constitutions, one of the mightiest juridical-political projects of modernity, betrays the degree of our insecurity by excluding or limiting the participation of minorities/marginalized groups. In short, this presentation aims to debate the idea of a constitution that can establish; a non-power relation; and that will attribute to the minority the conditions to lead a society to a new time of communitarian relations a cosmopolitan state. Thus, the participation of the excluded is a messianic condition of radical democracy.
Emotions and constitutional law exist in a relationship of dynamic equilibrium. Emotions inform constitutional decision-making and influence the formulation of legal rules. On the other hand, in reconciling private, individual emotions with collective social sentiments, constitutional law evaluates whether and to what extent particular emotions should be validated. These two components are sustained by a mutually reinforcing feedback loop. Constitutional law performs its regulatory role by reference to the emotional inputs it receives. In their turn, the resulting constitutional outputs shape and guide the emotional convictions of the relevant actors, and any emotional adjustment that occurs will correspondingly influence the process by which the (new) constitutional outcomes are produced. Further conditioned by the environment in which the feedback loop operates, this iterative interaction remains ever adaptive as it endeavours to arrive at optimal and carefully-negotiated outcomes.
Constitutional protections for the environment typically exhort governments, in broad terms, to pursue objectives such as mitigating climate change. This article identifies a species of environmental constitutional provision that, by securing quantified commitments, departs markedly from past approaches. The numeric precision of these ‘fixed constitutional commitments’ is intended to curtail vagueness, open-endedness and interest-balancing – features that, though standard in contemporary constitutional procedure, are poorly suited to chronic emergencies requiring unwavering policy responses over the extreme long term. Fixed constitutional commitments on the environment have been enacted in Australia (Victoria), Bhutan, Kenya and the United States (New York). Yet they raise both pragmatic and normative concerns. The article focuses on (and refutes) a significant normative objection: that taking foundational questions of substantive policy offline unduly curtails democratic deliberation.
The sustainability of the political relationship between people and institutions has been measured by indicators that even if accomplished do not cease the revolutionary behavior. This research study is aimed at the formulation of a Political Sustainability Index (PSI) to measure institutional legitimacy. To calculate the level of PSI between Autocracy, Democracy, and Ecocracy, data coded from the country case studies; Mozambique and Sweden that adopted constitution were classified in one of three political regimes through three categories: electoral, central, and local authorities. Observing both countries, Ecocracy has been revealed as the highest form of PS that dissuades revolutionary behavior, while autocracy and democracy, are concerned with the projection of ideologies. Correlation analyses indicate that the two countries are facing different stages of PS, but with the same pathways evolving to Ecocracy, where ideological constitutions are neutralized by scientific evidence.