This paper argues that domestic arrangements are not only changed by formal international norms. They are also transformed by State narratives as to why these norms should have authority within their territories. This is particularly so with regional trade agreements. Authority for their wide-ranging claims to obedience cannot provided by the meagre gains supplied by regional trade liberalisation. Significant regional trade arrangements seek authority, instead, by setting out models of Statehood for the region. Two ideal types have emerged, that of a civil order and that of the investee State. Through comparing Mercosur and ASEAN, this paper shows how these narratives lead not merely to different types of market, but different conceptions of the separation of powers, executive formation, regulatory styles, public discourse, and relations to foreigners. It concludes that the rise of the investee State narratives poses one of the most significant constitutional challenges of our time.
This paper argues that the ASEAN’s emerging framework for migration is both a result of, and has bolstered the region’s vision of a common identity based on the idea of a particular kind of State — the investee State — that the ASEAN Economic Community is meant to create. The economic integration project has challenged ASEAN States to engage with questions they may not have desired to address on a regional level, including the sensitive issue of migration. The paper analyses ASEAN’s regulation of both regular and irregular migration flows contrasting its approach with frameworks developed by other regional integration agreements. Despite underwhelming progress, and the region’s explicit rejection of, or a half-hearted support for the existing global schemes, the paper reveals the emerging contours of a unique normative framework for regulating regional migration flows. It fleshes out its nature, principles and role in building the ASEAN Economic Community and regional identity
This paper addresses the interaction between two ASEAN norms and Indonesia’s dual constitutionalism, particularly in the energy sector. The ASEAN norms are increasing foreign investment and private sector involvement. Indonesia’s dual system comprises two spheres of legislative action. In the first, the House of Representatives legislates subject to judicial oversight. In the second, the President passes regulations without judicial oversight, but with international oversight. Article 33 of the Constitution states that Indonesia’s natural resources must be controlled by the State. The Constitutional Court has ruled that the State’s control must be extensive. Furthermore, some DPR statutes are illiberal. However, because of some liberal Presidential regulations, the overall Indonesian regime converges with the ASEAN norms. I discuss how the President can do this. Finally, I discuss the desirability of this dual system for Indonesia and ASEAN economic integration.