I explore the dynamic constitutional order in risk society focusing on the issues of sharing economy. Sharing economy provides not only the chance to use asset and take free time but also convenience and low cost service to customers. On the other hand, there are some problems. For example, there are problem between landlord in Airbnb and tenant, and employment problem in Uber. In general, political branches response the risk, ex ante. The executive branch responses to these problems by applying the exist legal system and if necessary, the legislative branch will enact new law. When the regulations have potential risk to violate some constitutional rights, the court will decide the injunction to protect constitutional rights. But most of the cases, the court involves ex post. In these way, we need to consider constitutional issues in the various contexts including both ex ante and ex post. I figure out the outline to dynamic constitutional order taking the issues of sharing economy.
In the last years, online rating and reputational mechanisms have become increasingly important in the regulation of behavior in the platform economy. Consumers tend to rely on online reviews to distinguish between service providers. The European Commission, the Federal Trade Commission and a strand of legal scholarship have praised these mechanisms for generating valuable information, reducing market failures and consumer risks. However, this position has overlooked evidence suggesting that the additional data provided by online reputation does not address information asymmetries due to the multiple shortcomings of online reputational mechanisms. In this article, I discuss the regulatory potential of online reputation and offer a reflection on the assumption that the availability of more information reduces the need for public regulation.
How does the regulation of the sharing economy affect constitutional rights? This question is particularly salient in the area of property rights. In particular, do restrictions on short-term leasing (such as via Airbnb) constitute unconstitutional takings of private property without just compensation? Do these restrictions rise to the level of regulatory takings (in the U.S. context) or trigger “planning compensations rights” (in the European context)? In an attempt to answer these questions, I examine the nature of emerging short-term leasing restrictions in both the U.S. and Europe. I compare the types of regulatory schemes that are developing on either side of the Atlantic and the reasons employed to justify these regulations. Finally, I suggest a course of action that will preserve property rights while allowing governments to adapt to the rapidly changing nature of the sharing economy.