As demonstrated by the leaks of Facebook’s content moderation manuals, online platforms govern the speech published via their services pursuant to sui generis set of norms that aligns perfectly neither with the US nor with European standards for what constitutes legitimate expression. Such expression norms underwent significant changes from the moment of the inception of social media as such. Thus, the question arises how different forces might shape the online public discourse. The decision on where to place the boundaries of public discourse is eventually a normative one, requiring a judgment about the priorities of a given community. The assumption here is that the strengthening the protections for privacy online in Europe might be a factor for shaping social media community norms on a global scale. It will be tested through the development of the historical perspective on content moderation in parallel with the policy changes within the EU.
On modern democratic discourse, the core of State legitimacy is popular sovereignty, and this is based on the concept of political representativeness, in which the basis of citizen identity is established (Bernard Manin) and the idea of “people” is produced (Chantal Mouffe). Considering the political fake news and its effect on elections (on India, the United States, France, Brasil), the premises of auditory democracy (Manin) can have imploded itself, as result of the dissipation of holographic information. Consequently, it is possible to question whether the discursive core of sovereign legitimacy has deteriorated. Or rather, could the rise of a post-democratic state be affirmed? Or would it be a metamorphosis for a new form of political representation and legitimacy? This study proposes a legal-theoretical investigation of popular sovereignty, legitimacy, identity and representation on the search for clues to characterize the representativeness after fake news.
This paper analyzes the use of Twitter by the organs of the Administration (Government), which it calls institutional Twitter. For this purpose, it addresses the fundamentals of the use of institutional Twitter, its legal nature, the limits to its use and the legal nature of the tweets published therein.
Global concern about disinformation has been exploited by authoritarian states as an opportunity to enact new censorship laws and engage in repression of independent media. European democracies’ legislative moves in response to the disinformation threat have been cited by less democratic states to justify more sweeping legislation. Singapore, for example, is expected to introduce new laws after a policy debate that referred extensively to recent moves in Western Europe, such as Germany’s new internet enforcement law. This paper analyses authoritarian regimes’ discursive use of legal precedents set by democracies. These politically-motivated citations are usually selective and misleading, ignoring democratic jurisdictions’ checks and balances. Such discursive practices contribute to authoritarian contagion effects waves. Regimes may be imitating one another, or at least taking advantage of the general climate of “democratic recession” to engage in more repressive behaviour.
Social media shifts how people campaign during election. Although campaign in social media did not always end up in a good way, since election participants could possibly use social media to boost up black campaign. Black campaign could take shape as hate speech or disinformation. We learned from India, Brazil and Philippine’s election. However, combating disinformation and black campaign also relate to protection on freedom of speech from person and also political party/ presidential pair that involved in the election. The ability to campaign is protected right for election participant. The election process also need to be protected because it may lead people undermine electoral process, if the Indonesia Election Supervisory Board failed to response disinformation on election that has been spread out. In the mean time, needs to balance its conduct to protect people’s right to be informed about election and ensure that the spread of disinformation shall not harm electoral process.