Constitutional Jurisdiction may have a great impact on various fields. In economics matters, for example, the Court might, based on constitutional norms, invalidate governmental acts, interfering in the economic dynamic of a country. As economy plays a major role within a society and its political system, it becomes fundamental to understand the aspects able to interfere on it and, being Constitutional Jurisdiction one of them, it is crucial to study their relation.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyze the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court regarding the application of constitutional economics principles — such as Free Market and Free Enterprise. This paper seeks to analyze what both Courts understand about how the government should behave when regulating economy, the economic principles that they are inclined to apply, as well as the meaning given to them and, finally, to compare the results found from both Courts.
Sometimes, solving sensitive issues and reconciling national and international commitments is a difficult task. Moreover when the preservation of trust internationally involves measures that do not benefit from a trust capital internally. In Romania, a typical situation in this sense refers to the issue of detention conditions.
Thus, in a social and political climate dominated by distrust towards the criminal policy measures envisaged, as well as dissatisfaction with the compensatory measures adopted, the next steps seem to be difficult. However, extreme legislative measures aimed at responding to internal dissatisfaction, such as the recent repeal of the law regarding the compensatory measures, somewhat populist in the electoral context, affects the trust internationally.
The study is intended as an invitation to debate. In our opinion, solving the issue of detention conditions in Romania is fundamentally related to the trust towards authorities.
This paper argues that private actors in the digital environment are displacing and re-articulating public, normative standards through their contractual terms and practical operation. The paper contextualises this trend as part of the ideological legacy of the historical development of the web but argues that it has been specifically enabled by three features of EU law. These are 1) an approach of functional equivalence to laws governing the digital environment, and the actors within it 2) the EU’s neoliberal policy preferences which manifest in a tendency towards the enumeration of economic rather than socially orientated legislative rights protections and 3) the Unions ‘brittle constitutionalism.’ The result of these features and the rise in private standard setting and rights enforcement they generate is an erosion of individual fundamental rights, in particular the rights to privacy and property, which in turn import reductions in individual autonomy and the Rule of Law.
The courts have not been an exception to the trend of increasing technologization of the public sector and have for a number of years invested in digital uplift projects. Beyond the routine use of technology, many jurisdictions are considering the introduction of more sophisticated applications to automate elements of, or even entirely replace, humans in judicial decision-making processes. Many are asking whether machine learning and other AI applications should assists judiciary in decision-making, and how that might correspondingly transform the role of judges. In this paper, we ask how new uses of technology might, impact judicial values and judges’ own sense of themselves, and even transform the judicial role in contemporary societies. We do this through a focused examination of core judicial values, namely transparency and accountability, independence, impartiality, diversity, and efficiency; and how they may be either supported or undermined by increasing technologization.
Th paper covers the problems faced in Malta where the Constitutional Court has decided that a judgement on the validity of alws is only binding intra partes and not erga omnes. This declaration is linked with the requirement of juridical interest or legal standing required by Maltese jurisprudence to file a constitutional case. Only those having e a juridical interest in a case on the validity of laws are bound by an eventual judgment on such case.
States embracing Islam-based laws are frequently seen as struggling with establishing democratic institutions, and encouraging executive encroachment on the judiciary. Public in these countries often does not trust state institutions. lack of rule of law further exacerbates citizens’ distrust in public law. Is Islam-based legal language in a domestic legal system associated with lower levels of electoral democracy, fewer protections for private liberties, and a weak judiciary. Relying on original data covering laws in 29 Islamic law states (2001-2012), we focus on Islam-based legal language in these states’ constitutional and subconstitutional laws. By itself, Islam-based legal language is not associated with a weak judiciary or the absence of political liberties. However, subconstitutional—particularly legislative—commitments to Islam-based legal language are frequently associated with lower levels of democracy and fewer protections for private liberties and women’s rights.
This paper examines judicial conceptions of the doctrine of constitutional unamendability, articulated by candidates for appointment to the Slovak Constitutional Court in the 2019 selection hearings. These hearings took place at the heels of a historic decision of the Court on the implicit “material core” of the Constitution, which invalidated parts of a constitutional amendment. Every candidate received a question on the subject at least once during the five rounds of hearings took place between January 23 and September 10. They struggled, in front of live cameras, to answer whether constitutional unamendability is a tool that has an appropriate place in the toolbox of the Constitutional Court. this paper uses the collected replies from the selection hearing as a probe into thinking of legal professionals vying for a position on the most powerful court of the land. The result is a contextualised understanding of a material core and constitutional unamendability.
Although constitutions lay out the fundamental principles by which countries are governed, identifying exactly which legal materials are considered constitutional is not straightforward. This is for two reasons. First, there is no systematic evidence about the relative importance of countries’ formal, written constitutions—the “Large-C” constitution—versus the broader body of constitutional law derived from sources like judicial decisions, treaties, and conventions—the “small-c” constitution. Second, it is often difficult to establish which legal materials are definitively part of a country’s small-c constitution. We investigate small-c constitutions using a global expert survey on the nature of constitutional rights protection to 188 experts from 103 countries. The results illustrate that Large-C constitutions are the primary source of constitutional rights in a majority of countries, but small-c constitutions also plays a significant role, especially in older constitutional systems.
This paper argues that the current Chilean social outbreak could be explained by the early modern idea of the right to resist. It also argues that the theory of deliberative democracy is appropriate to manage the conflicts that give rise to this right.
For early constitutionalism, the right to resist was the power to challenge the ruler when he tried to impose decisions that were illegitimate for those who should obey them. Considered as alienable right, modern democracies avoid its exercise creating institutions and procedures to legitimize political decisions through representative decision-making.
In Chile this framework failed. Constitutional decision-making devices have lost legitimacy and a large part of the population is defying the law. Finally, a referendum was called to decide on the adoption of a new constitution.
Just as a deliberative democratic device allowed measured resistance, the new constitution could incorporate others in it to improve Chilean democracy.
According to the OECD research the Czech Republic is a country with the second highest rate of laws proposed by the Parliament. Combined with the fact that the right to initiate an amendment to a debated bill is a right already vested to the individual lawmaker, the Czech legislative procedure is facing unique problem of its decentralisation. Especially peculiar is a fact that bills are often covering very sensitive areas with high socioeconomical impacts – laws such as Contract Register Act or the Baillif Code are both examples of very impactful pieces of legislation where regulatory impact assessment was not conducted. Furthermore, the Government must respond to such proposals, usually by introducing its own legislative proposal, therefore individual bills serve as an agenda setting tools. However, from theoretical point of view of legisprudence, such behaviour leads to a legislative inflation and very often to the regulatory failures as well.