Tarun Khaitan will give a conceptual and functional account of guarantor institutions, in terms of their role in make non-self-enforcing constitutional promises credible and enduring. He will also discuss some design implications of this account.
Dinesha Samararatne will draw from her study of the evolution of the Guarantor Branch in Sri Lanka to argue that early signs are that this branch is a constitutional innovation that is developing resilience by stealth. Even though the Guarantor Branch has not been supported by strong governments or by the judiciary, it has been central to the state formation project in Sri Lanka, as a way of advancing constitutionalism.
There is no 'standard template' for the design of fourth branch institutions. Drawing on experience of having been involved in constitution-building processes, this paper will outline some of the common choices, options, and problems faced by constitutional designers when determining the composition and structure of fourth branch institutions, in particular considering how dilemmas between inclusion and neutrality, and between independence and accountability, can be solved.
Antonia Baraggia will explore in comparative perspective the nature and the powers of NHRI(s) across Europe in time of emergency and it will investigate the function of NHRI(s) as guarantor institutions vis à vis the executive, the judiciary and the legislature. After a theoretical introduction about the nature of these institutions, the paper will analyze the role of NHRI(s) in monitoring fundamental rights protection, in advising authorities and policy-makers on the human rights impact of emergency provisions. The analysis will cover several European NHRI(s) which, despite having different institutional nature and powers, have proven to be quite effective in monitoring the human rights compliance of emergency’s measures. The analysis will also consider the case of Italy, with a particular focus on the implications of the lack of a NHRI on fundamental rights protection.