This paper considers the institutional structures for financial supervision in France, Germany and Italy. In particular, it examines how it has evolved over time and how much of the changes introduced were inspired by reforms at the EU (or global) level and how much of them were, instead, triggered by dynamics inherent to these Member States themselves. Setting particular emphasis on the Banking Union and its impact, this paper shows that the influence of the reforms performed at the EU level has been rather limited.
This article analyses the impact the creation of the European Banking Union has had on the regulation and supervision of the Spanish banking sector, which requires the examination of the sector’s evolution since Spain joined the euro area. The article reviews the changes introduced following the adoption of the single currency in 1999. Four different periods can be distinguished since then: a) from joining the euro area to the start of the crisis in 2007; b) the crisis years up to the bailout of the banking sector with European funds in 2012; c) the period during which the conditions imposed by the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) were introduced; and d) the period following the beginning of the Banking Union and the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in 2014 and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in 2015.
The institutional architecture of macro-prudential supervision in the EU is rather complex. The framework built in 2010 around the European Systemic Risk Board and the authorities established on the basis of the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities has been progressively complemented by the National Designated Authorities pursuant to the CRD/CRR package and the European Central Bank (Art. 5 and 9 SSM Reg). The plurality of institutions involved in the conduct of macro-prudential policy and supervision lead to complexity because of the need to establish coordination arrangements among these institutions and of the variety of the relevant powers (soft law or binding powers; powers to directly adopt macro-prudential measures or topping-up powers; spanning from the EU to the pure national ones or limited to those harmonized at EU level). Also, macro-prudential supervision essentially remains a national power, which some authorities (esp. central banks) already had beforehand.
In late 2021, the Parliament of Latvia endorsed the reform of the institutional framework of the financial supervision following which the Financial and Capital Market Commission, Latvian financial supervisory authority, will be integrated into the Bank of Latvia (BoL). BoL will emerge thereafter as a national central bank with one of the broadest mandates in eurozone covering monetary policy, financial supervision and resolution, and administration of deposit guarantee schemes. This paper explores the impact of the EU integration process on the decision of Latvian authorities to abandon the institutional separation of monetary and supervisory functions in favour of a fully integrated supervisory model. It also assesses the new governance framework of the BoL by drawing parallels with the structural arrangements introduced at the European Central Bank upon the institution of the Single Supervisory Mechanism to guarantee independent exercise of its monetary policy and supervisory tasks.