The theoretical background of the fundamental rights concept of legal capacity

Who are the subjects of fundamental rights (FRs)? Who may claim FRs protection personally before courts? No conclusive general answer so far, not even for human beings (cf. the legal status of the foetus, the capacity to act with mental disorders). However, it is an essential question that courts, even if implicitly, face in all FRs-related cases.
The effectiveness of FRs protection significantly depends on having a well-founded and comprehensive general concept of legal capacity to FRs, which takes into consideration the real access to FRs (for all human beings, for their organizations, and considering new challengers, e.g. nature, animals, AI).
The presentation addresses the demonstrated project's theoretical approach, namely that we examine the legal capacity to FRs before courts and build theory following the identification of practical incapacities. This implies that we argue to consider legal enforceability as a substantive element of the notion of FRs.

Legal capacity of persons with impaired or developing decision-making capacity. Exercising fundamental rights for children, persons with disabilities and the elderly

The fundamental rights legal capacity of human persons is often taken for granted. However, there are certain vulnerable groups (persons with disabilities, children and the elderly) who – based on a presumed or actual impairment of decision-making capacity – have their right to exercise fundamental rights restricted. The presentation explores the connections between legal capacity, decision-making capacity and the exercise of fundamental rights for persons with impaired or still developing decision-making capacities. The methodology is a dogmatic approach that is built upon the results of case studies and the experiences of persons concerned. Thus, the problem mapping is entirely based on the real life situations where certain groups experience a restriction in exercising their fundamental rights. The fundamental rights dogmatics point of view is then adopted in an attempt to identify the underlying fundamental rights aspects and considerations.

Can organisations have fundamental rights?

The idea of organisations being fundamental rights (FRs) holders appears to be inherently contradictory. How could organisations invoke FRs designed especially for the protection of living human beings? The organisation’s involvement in FRs protection is a complex subject encompassing many components.
The first part of our examination focuses on the right holder and the organisation’s concept from a FRs perspective. While in the field of FRs, there is a tendency for governmental organs are excluded from the scope of FRs holders, this is not the case in civil law. It indicates the necessity of a specific organisation concept based on a FRs approach and the clarification of why organisations can be FRs holders.
The second part of our presentation is about the fundamental right concerned and the factors that influence organisations’ FRs protection, e.g. the meaning of a fundamental right’s nature and the significance of its individual or collective characteristics.

Robot emancipation, or what future challenges the legal personality must face

Artificial intelligence constitutes challenges for fundamental rights (FRs). In modern times and legal systems, the legal personality of human beings is unquestionably recognized. While human life is the central idea behind FRs, the legal status cannot be limited to the individual, as organizations can be recognized as legal persons. Social and political debates take place on legally acknowledging other entities (nature, animals), broadening the range of rights-holders. The issue of the legal status of robots and artificial intelligence also fits into this pattern. Can legal personality be interpreted in the case of intelligent machines (objects)? Threats posed by technology to other areas of FRs are already with us, though the sentient and intellectually (and perhaps eventually morally) superior machines may never come to pass. Our goal is to seek answers by mapping the foundations of dogmatics of FRs and set short-, medium-term, and long-term perspectives.