Russia is used to be one of the main “targets” of the ECtHR. The context of political rights, guaranteed especially by Art. 3 of Protocol 1, is particularly relevant in showing the development of the relationship between the constitutional dimension and the ECHR within the Russian legal order. Within this context, a systematization of the case-law concerning Art. 3 of Protocol 1 (the right to passive electorate; to active electorate, focusing especially on prisoners’ right to vote; and to the democratic and electoral process) will be provided, in order to assessing the impact of the ECtHR’s case-law on the Russian legal order and citizens’ rights, by verifying whether and how the former contributes to redesign both constitutional and legislative framework of the latter.
If we look at the good performance by the UK within the Convention system and at the well-functioning mechanisms provided by the Human Rights Act at national level, we may be surprised that the prisoners’ voting right issue has been for such a long time the battleground of a “political war” between the ECtHR and UK. But why is that? The reason is quite obvious: the issue touches upon the societal values of the community and the foundation of democracy. Surprisingly after the clamour of the long period of resistance, the epilogue of the prisoners’ voting saga has arrived quietly. The rather weak solution proposed by the UK and endorsed by the Committee of Ministers, could be read as a victory for all (a Pyrrich victory for the Convention system and a political victory for the UK). The proposed paper will look through the prisoners’ voting saga, highlighting the two sides of the conflict and it will deepen the (possible) adverse consequences of the UK’s minimalist compliance.
The relationship between Venezuela and the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights has undergone a series of abrupt changes and profound disagreements in recent years. With respect to Venezuela, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled on the violation of the political rights contained in Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights in the cases of Reverón Trujillo and López Mendoza. Knowing the current state of compliance with the reparation measures ordered by the Court in the above-mentioned cases can outline a general vision of how Inter-American regional justice helped to vindicate human rights violations in an adverse political climate for supranational institutions. The political crisis in Venezuela is far from over, but the Court’s precedents, together with the inter-American standards established to date, may help discern a way out that is consistent with the regional consensus on the rights that should govern a democratic society.
Colombia has a particular context that impacts negatively and seriously human rights. However, as far as the violation of political rights is concerned, Colombia was declared internationally responsible by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights only three times. This paper tries to detect a pattern or degree of success (or failure) of the Colombian democracy in front of the IACtHR. To achieve this, it will focus on the reparations ordered by the regional tribunal and to what extent they are obeyed and complied with.
With this study, we will observe the impact these decisions have had on Colombia’s internal government and society (mainly in administrative, economic, legal, and social scopes). Moreover, this work has also given us an overview of the Inter-American system’s effectiveness, its benefits related to the impulse of actions to favour the Colombian democratic transition, and the more critical challenges it may face.
The ‘democratic argument’ encompassed in article 3 of the Protocol 1 of the ECHR has been called into question against Turkey in the appeals for the dissolution of political parties as well as for the lift of the parliamentary immunity of several MPs. Quantitatively, until 2019, the ECtHR has been appealed for a violation of article 3
Protocol 1 of the ECHR by Turkey in 17 cases and has declared the violation in 11 of them. The proposed paper is divided in two parts. Part I briefly presents the common elements of the abovementioned 11 decisions, highlighting whether they envisaged a violation of the democratic argument in a domestic legal provision or in a practice of the Turkish institutions. Part II, then, focuses on the measures enacted at the domestic level to face the consequences of the ECtHR decisions ascertaining a violation, also providing some hints with regard to economic costs these decisions entailed for the country.