The concept of constitutional conventions, although more typical for Commonwealth countries, has had its impact also in other countries, including the Czech Republic. A major role in the recognition of constitutional conventions in the Czech Republic’s constitutional system and of their relevance in constitutional adjudication has been played by the Czech Constitutional Court. The paper focuses on the analysis of the important case-law of the Czech Constitutional Court on the subject which literally “opened the gate” for constitutional scholars’ engagement with constitutional conventions in the Czech Republic. It will also suggest why – despite the foregoing – the court's usage of the concept has been until today rather scarce.
The 30-year period of experience with democracy in Slovakia has raised a lot of constitutional issues to be solved. The theme of unwritten constitutional law was not among those to which the greatest attention was paid. Nevertheless, it has become clear that the constitutional texts do not cover all the issues that constitutional practice raises and that also in the constitutional system of Slovakia there are elements that can be considered as constitutional customs. This fact is also proved by the growing interest of the Slovak theory in the issue of unwritten constitutional law in recent years. The aim of this paper is to identify unwritten elements in the constitutional practice of Slovakia, to analyse them and, on that basis, to evaluate their exact nature and force.
The mainstream Hungarian constitutional scholarship denies the existence of customary law and conventions, and claims that practices and usages are only categories of political sciences.
The contribution aims to picture the evolvement of doctrine and case-law regarding constitutional conventions and to point out the weaknesses of the mainstream scholarship. It also aims to point out those elements of conventions and customary law which were observed contrary to the doctrinal view of the non-existence. As a conclusion, it aims to offer an explanation why conventions did not evolve as a constitutional category and to contest the mainstream doctrine.