Skepticism about law can be justified on different grounds. Queer theorists, for example, have an ambivalent relationship with law. Likewise, Many such scholars would argue that, by entering the realm of law, non-normative identities face the risk of normalization, civilization, and assimilation into the dominant paradigm. An example in this regard is the rich literature on (or, more correctly, against) same-sex marriage.he paper will explain how certain laws are a suitable tool for the legal recognition of queer families, namely registration schemes which do not take the archetypical marital family as their benchmark.
Radical feminists in the United States always detected in law a tool of oppression, which as such is unable to lift marginalized identities in society. Other feminist theorists used instead law to push forward a cultural and social change. In particular, the paper will use Ruth Bader Ginsburg's legal philosophy on gender issues as embodying a struggle for the emancipation of marginalized identities through, rather than outside of the law.
A robust skepticism against law is fed by those maintaining that law is not an effective tool of social change – without this necessarily entailing that law is a dangerous tool. Against this backdrop, the paper will analyze the framing effects of law as a social institution in the context of law and religion controversies.