In the beginning, President Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi) was considered a new hope for democracy. So when running for the 2014 Presidential Election, public support flowed extraordinarily. Jokowi was Indonesia's new hope after the reformation movement in 1998 did not make much difference. Jokowi was known as an anti-corruption figure, not a party leader, and opposed the dynastic political ideas. However, during Jokowi's first period (2014-2019), his government policies did not significantly meet public expectations. Even after being confirmed as elected president for the second period (2019-2024), Jokowi had chosen a surprising policy. President Jokowi was involved in weakening the Corruption Eradication Commission's thorough revision of the law. This paper is intended to illustrate Jokowi political movement and what does condition that makes public distrust into his regime. Jokowi has changed from who is expected to bring goodness to be an ordinary politician from hero to zero.
Indonesia’s Constitutional Court was established in 2003 through constitutional amendments. During its first decade, the Court lived up to expectations, enjoying a high level of public trust. This sense of achievement ended abruptly when Chief Justice Akil Mochtar was caught red-handed in a bribery case in 2013. Public trust in the Constitutional Court plummeted to just 28 percent. The Court managed to restore its credibility after successfully resolving disputes over the 2014 Presidential Election. However, shortly after this recovery, the Court was hit by another thunderstorm. Justice Patrialis Akbar was caught receiving bribes in 2017. Interestingly, the level of public trust in the Constitutional Court has climbed to 70.2 percent. This article examines the factors that caused the fall and rise of public trust in the Indonesian Constitutional Court. It also analyses the crisis management undertaken by the Court to restorepublic trust and maintain its legitimacy.
Institutional reform is an important approach in the discussion on law reform. For many institutions working on law reform, ranging from country governments and non-governmental organizations, it was an approach that often replaces phrase ‘law reform’ itself. However, there are major weaknesses that lie behind institutional reform. First, institutional reforms tend to fail to measure the impact on the delivery of justice to the society. Second, institutional reform tends to ignore the politics of law reform, which is highly related to the actors and how constitutional bodies interact in the framework of constitutional arrangements. This paper will examine how the institutional reform approach might have failed in law reform in Indonesia that started in 1998. The cases of the Corruption Eradication Commission and the Supreme Court will be used to assess how far the institutional reform has had an impact on public trust over state institutions and constitutional ideas of the rule of law
As a country applying the Continental system, Indonesia has heavily relied on statues. Statutes become one of the most important sources of law. Sadly, however, statutes are often considered as a matter of politics, rather than as a matter of legal. Consequently, statutes as a product of legislature have been often labeled as political products denying both formal and material legal principles, such as principles of public participation and prudently, to name a few. This paper analyzes practices of law-making within the Indonesian constitutional system during the Reform era (1998-2020). In order to make systematic discussions, I will divide periods based on the president’s term of office, which is administrations of Habibie (1998-19990), Abdurahman Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati (2001-2004), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), and Joko Widodo (2014-now). It is argued that public trust toward law-making in Indonesia has considerably decreased as the democracy backsliding happens.
The relation between national and international law in Indonesia has found a concrete form in the ratification process of international treaties. Although ratification has a strong constitutional basis and further elaborated in the Act No 24/2000 on international treaties, it still raises controversies, especially that relates to public participation in this ratification process. In practice, however, publics have no sufficient access for participating in the process of ratification. In the case of judicial review against Law No. 38/2008 on the Ratification of the ASEAN Charter in 2011 provided evidence that public had limited access for taking part in the ratification process, while the content of the ASEAN Charter bound and applied directly to the Indonesian citizens. This paper proposes a model of public participation in the ratification process that is legally acceptable and politically accommodating to public aspirations.
During the electoral process consists of several cycles, voting and recapitulation process usually consider as the most important cycle. However, the electoral cycle has been started since the registration of candidate, campaign, campaign fund report, blackout period, and election results disputes. Having electoral result disputes alone, setting aside the protection of electoral cycle itself because electoral violation could happen at each cycle of the electoral cycle. This paper intends to argue that having an electoral supervision mechanism with effective remedy at every cycle of the electoral process will enhance public trust towards the election result. However, theoretical framework towards electoral supervision is beyond than electoral mechanism procedural, but public law discussion and relate to the constitutional law mechanism. Building trust is more than just two-person responsibility. Supervising the election is not a single agency scope of work but other government agencies