The paper will outline both the similarities between the German and Italian constitutions, that are to be especially underlined in the two first parts of the two texts. On state powers, differences will have to be analyzed, especially in relation with the anti-Weimar reaction in Germany where referendums and strong political parties were looked upon with suspicion, while in Italy those two aspects were more easily accepted by the constituent assembly. Even though the constituent debate in Italy was inspired by the failure of the Weimar Republic, most proposal that went in the same direction were rejected by Italian political parties. Amongst some constitutional provision that will be analyzed to show those differences, electoral laws of the two countries will be evaluated as well, because, while not part of the constitutional texts themselves, they are part of the material constitution of the two countries.
The vestiges of the Grundgesetz in the Spanish constitution are seen in the form of the State (social and democratic state under the rule of law), the type of government (rationalized parliamentarian system), and the defining elements of the fundamental rights (the direct effect and the respect to the essential content). Furthermore, despite the open discussion about the federal nature of the current Spanish horizontal distribution of power, we can find the German influence on that constitutional element too, including the so-called instrument of federal coercion recently activated in Spain. The object of this contribution is to identify the analogies between both constitutional texts and to deepen in the study of these two constitutional siblings. The convergences in the development of both texts under the European Union, that have been defined several times by a shared defence of the corresponding national identity.
The scope of the paper is to provide a concise retrospective analysis of the influence exerted by the German basic law and case-law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the Albanian constitutional system. For this purpose, the paper will be focused on three selected topics. Firstly, it will analyze the model of Inquiry commissions established in the Albanian Constitution designed akin to that of the German Basic Law. Secondly, it will touch upon the constitutional amendment of 2008 which remodeled the motion of non-confidence akin to the German model of constructive vote of non-confidence. Thirdly, it will focus on the more recent developments in the framework of the justice reform, by analyzing the redesign of the constitutional appeal model based on the Verfassungsbeschwerde. Lastly, few conclusions will be drawn on the complexities of adopting and adjusting the application of such provisions in the Albanian context.
Hungary has traditionally been part of the German legal culture, the impact of the German constitutional system on the Hungarian one is not surprizing. The allocation of power between state organs, especially the role of the constititutional court are evidences to this. Hovewer, in practical terms, the solutions of the Grundgesetz are not always functioning properly in Hungary. Formal arrangements are easier to implement than constitutional and political culture.