The behavior of judges in asymmetric tie-breaking power conditions has been barely studied empirically. Most courts are designed as an odd-numbered panel where –theoretically– each judge hold the same probability of deciding the court’s outcome. Accordingly, less attention has been given to the behavior of judges in even-numbered panels where votes’ weight is –by design– distributed unequally among judges. Based on an original database on votes in non-unanimous decisions by a Chilean administrative tribunal formed by 4 judges where its president hold tie-breaking power, this research test whether differences in votes’ weight among judges explain judicial coalition formation, while controlling for the judges’ ideological preferences. In doing so, the study enhance our understanding of the institutional determinants of the judicial decision-making.

Our 2020 Annual Conference was scheduled to be held at the University of Wrocław in Poland on July 9-11, 2020.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the ICON·S Executive Committee has decided to postpone our 2020 Conference to 2021. Our next Annual Conference will take place from July 8-10, 2021, in Wrocław, Poland.
Procedural details regarding the organization of the 2021 Conference will follow in the months ahead.
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