The theoretical background of the fundamental rights concept of legal capacity

Who are the subjects of fundamental rights (FRs)? Who may claim FRs protection personally before courts? No conclusive general answer so far, not even for human beings (cf. the legal status of the foetus, the capacity to act with mental disorders). However, it is an essential question that courts, even if implicitly, face in all FRs-related cases.
The effectiveness of FRs protection significantly depends on having a well-founded and comprehensive general concept of legal capacity to FRs, which takes into consideration the real access to FRs (for all human beings, for their organizations, and considering new challengers, e.g. nature, animals, AI).
The presentation addresses the demonstrated project's theoretical approach, namely that we examine the legal capacity to FRs before courts and build theory following the identification of practical incapacities. This implies that we argue to consider legal enforceability as a substantive element of the notion of FRs.