The Resilience of Transnational Regulatory Networks in the Age of Authoritarian Pushback

At the end of the 90s, Anne Marie Slaughter claimed transnational regulatory networks (TRNs) were an extremely promising form of global governance because of their flexibility, speed, and informality. This optimistic attitude changed in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. At the beginning of this decade, David Zaring argued that the crisis showed the failure of TRNs and that political bodies such as the G20 would instead take the lead in global governance.
Ten years after the crisis, however, the developments in financial reforms show a striking resilience of transnational networks. Their role in the development of a number of global financial standards is crucial and it is not substituted by political actors such as the G20, as the Basel Committee’s process of revision of Basel III shows. The paper will seek to explain the reasons behind the success of transnational networks, both purely regulatory and hybrid ones, in an age characterized by nationalist pushback.