In this paper, I argue that Philip Pettit’s republican conception of democracy offers the basis of a compelling normative justification for the institution of judicial review that is distinctive from the mainstream legal constitutionalist justifications and (contra Richard Bellamy), that accounts for the main objections of political constitutionalists. The paper seeks to connect this general republican case for judicial review with contemporary “non-epistemic” defenses of the institution, including Mattias Kumm’s “Socratic contestation” defense, Dixon's democratic responsiveness defense, and the Harel/Shinar “right to a hearing” defense. It also considers whether this republican argument makes a case for weak-form review only, or whether it extends in principle to judicial supremacy.
Our 2020 Annual Conference was scheduled to be held at the University of Wrocław in Poland on July 9-11, 2020.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the ICON·S Executive Committee has decided to postpone our 2020 Conference to 2021. Our next Annual Conference will take place from July 8-10, 2021, in Wrocław, Poland.
Procedural details regarding the organization of the 2021 Conference will follow in the months ahead.Join ICON•S