The relationship between constitutional amendment procedure, judicial review and judge’s appointments. The United States and Chile case

The main idea of this research is to contrast the constitutional amendment procedure, the judicial review and judge´s appointments. Considering the United States and Chile cases, this investigation will analyze if a rigid constitutional amendment procedure produces a more activist judicial review. The comparison between the United States and Chilean Constitutions reinforces the theory made by professor Elikins, Ginsburg and Melton, in order that the flexibility in a constitutional allows high durability of a Constitution.
The Chilean Constitution is flexible enough and there is no need for a new constitution because the political actors have been using the amendment procedure many times. The Judicial Review in Chile is not so relevant. In the case of the United States, the US constitution looks inflexible but is a flexible document because it allows the States to enact their own constitutions. In addition, the statistics don´t show a strong judicial review.