The paradoxes in the protection of legitimate expectations in the constitutional court’s reasoning: Italy and France compared.

The contribution aims to demonstrate the limited scope of the protection afforded to legitimate expectations, especially in the presence of a “preeminent” public interest.
In particular, it will focus on a ruling by the Italian Constitutional Court concerning the withdrawal of incentives previously recognized by the State, analyzing the motivational strategy used by the Court to reject the claim of a breach of legitimate expectations made by the beneficiary companies, as the possibility of the unfavorable changes to the regulation of long-term relationships falls within the regulatory risk of an enterprise.
The comparison with French case-law on infrastructure shows that in France, where the principle of “confiance légitime” isn’t recognized as a general principle of the State, legitimate expectations receive, in fact, a broader protection, albeit through motivations founded on the principle of the “responsabilité sans faute de l’État”.