The EPPO’s Independence: A Guarantee for More Effective Protection of the Union’s Financial Interests?

When establishing the EPPO, the EU legislator insisted on the independence of this new hybrid judicial actor. The underlying idea was that, in order to better protect the Union’s financial interests through criminal law, the EPPO should be able to prosecute ‘without direct influence of national authorities’. Considering national authorities are sometimes themselves involved in EU fraud, the EPPO’s independence is a key element in ensuring better enforcement.
Yet, the EPPO’s implementation process showed that this independence might actually be a two-edged sword. For instance, if set apart both legally and physically from the existing national public prosecutor’s office, the European Delegated Prosecutors risk to be regarded as outsiders and to become isolated from existing structures, hampering the smooth cooperation with national authorities.
Therefore, how to interpret this independence in a way to meet the EPPO’s core objectives? Could a functional approach be the answer?