The blind-spot(s) of the rule of law thinking in (continental European) criminal law theory

German and continental European criminal law theory is rooted in 19th century rule of law thinking. My presentation will explore, by way of two examples, its blind-spot(s) and how they are to be remedied. With regard to criminalization theory, I will claim that substantive theories fail to address questions of procedural legitimation in democratic polities . With regard to criminal law doctrine, I will shed light on why (and if) justifications (like self-defense or possibly whistle blowing) do not require a positive codification in a certain and parliamentary norm. Put differently, I will explore why the legality principle is not applied to justifications, although actual criminal liability depends on both the realization of the positive elements of an offense, and the non-realization of any justification. My presentation will bring to the fore that this doctrinal state of affairs results from blind-spot(s) of an outdated rule of law thinking.