Neo-authoritarian political developments have reignited interest in the division of powers. Our paper focuses on Mexican constitutional agencies (OCAs), comprising nine institutions as varied as the electoral agency (INE), the ombuds (CNDH), the Central bank (Banxico), the anti-trust bodies (COFECE, IFETEL), or the transparency agency (INAI). Our analysis suggests that OCAs have contributed to democratic politics by generating various political goods, well beyond the “technical” responsibilities that supported their initial creation. In our view, they provide crucial institutional spaces in the quest to find bottom-up democratic venues that help constrain neo-messianic presidents, operating not only reactively and ex post, but in a decentralized and structural way. Promising as it may seem, taking this stance versus OCAs also forces us to ponder what reforms and adjustments may guarantee accountability and boost their positive political contributions while minimizing their risks.
We look forward to welcoming you on July 3-5, 2023 for our Annual Conference entitled "Islands and Ocean: Public Law in a Plural World." The conference will take place at the Victoria University of Wellington, in New Zealand. We will be announcing more details about the conference soon, including financial support to early career and global south scholars!