Ruling in a Rush. Legislative Bodies between Decisionist Temptations and Functionalist Presumptions

The pandemic saw a new wave of exceptionalist analysis of political power exercised in difficult times. However, not every state of emergency should be labeled as a state of exception à la C. Schmitt.
The paper addresses this idea at a methodological level, arguing that there is no theoretical obstacle for a Constitution, from a normativistic point of view, to preview all the required means to address an emergency. Conversely, it is more debated whether such a background may coexist with the strong functionalist demands derived from an impellent necessity, which may even result in an enhanced role for a technocratic power at the expense of Parliament.
Thus, it is arguable that to carefully balance the democratic quality of legislation and its celerity, it is required to support constitutional law with a proper theoretical framework able to clarify the correct relationship among instrumental and value-rationality in the democratic procedure when it comes to the law-making temporality.