Public Law Compensation as a Constitutional Remedy and the Theory of ‘Bricolage’ in Bangladesh

The issue of having public law compensation as a constitutional remedy first surfaced in Bilkis case (1996) in Bangladesh. Textual interpretation of Article 102(1) of the Constitution clearly accommodates the scope for granting compensation as a constitutional remedy. In spite of having such constitutional mandate, in affirming and granting public law compensation as a constitutional remedy, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in all cases, relied on comparative constitutional law. The objectives of this paper are twofold: first, to trace and describe the development of the idea of public law compensation as a constitutional remedy in Bangladesh; and second, to argue that the judicial affirmation of the idea of public law compensation as a constitutional remedy is an example of ‘constitutional borrowing’ by ‘bricolage’, a theory of comparative constitutional law advocated by Mark Tushnet. (Professor Dr Muhammad Ekramul Haque)