“Political” or “Legal” Constitutionalism? A nuanced account beyond the dichotomy

The paper aims at offering a modern account of the “political v. legal constitution(alism)” debate, arguing that the dichotomy between the two is a largely outdated one, given the ‘normative turn’ of the former. The existent more colourful institutional picture deserves a more nuanced account, since (among other reasons): (a) it is often the Parliament that gives room to the Constitutional Court and vice versa (see the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s PSPP decision); (b) the binarism between the Court and the Legislator does not hold anymore, as other players, such as independent authorities, or non-elected executive organs, supranational Courts etc are also significant; (c) taking sides presupposes a pre-hermeneutical theory of constitutional democracy, i.e. the mixture of liberalism and majoritarianism, the institutions serving each dimension and the balances between them.