Pluralist Incommensurability and Non-Domination

The paper makes a claim for upholding an epistemic pluralist account of EU constitutionalism, and reinterprets it in the light of the category of non-domination. An underlying argument is that this vision of pluralism, initiated by Neil Walker, may be in many respects coherent with the tradition grounding the legitimacy of supranational relations on the lack of arbitrary power.
In order to further unfold the argument, a reference to the work of Alasdair MacIntyre will be suggested. MacIntyre, analysing ‘oppressive social relationships’, offers a version of the understanding of liberty as non-domination. Domination is equated with restrictions on actors’ possibility of engaging in practical reasoning.
What is common for Walker and MacIntyre is that both focus on incommensurability of axiological standpoints. MacIntyre’s ways of addressing domination in the context of incommensurability may help to elaborate the epistemic pluralist account.