Parliamentary control of security policies uncovers an apparent paradox: it relies on the sharing of information that is strictly put under executive dominance not to harm the essential security interests.
This issue is gaining renewed interest at European level after the establishment of the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG) on Europol. Access to sensitive non-classified or classified information retained by Europol for purposes of parliamentary control is shaped asymmetrically: pursuant to art. 52 Reg. EU 2016/794, it is explicitly recognised only to the EP, but not to the JPSG.
Based on a vision of parliamentary control of EU security policy as a shared task both of national parliaments and of the EP, the proposed paper discusses two alternative legal solutions. One addresses the EP’s legal duty to share this information within the JPSG. Another solution relates to the mediated access to information through national mechanisms of parliamentary control of Europol activity.