Judicial Vetting – Rethinking Means of Strengthening Judicial Independence

Judicial vetting, process also known as “judicial re-evaluation” and “screening” has been in theory so far analyzed prevalently as a controversial, but yet efficient means of obtaining transitional justice, especially in the context of the post-communist lustration laws. However, several other theoretical approaches have emerged, which assess the judicial vetting through the lens of 1) human rights abuses; 2) institutional capacity building; 3) signaling (regime change). This paper will focus on the judicial vetting as a means of institutional capacity building of the countries with the “systematic deficiency of the rule of law” (Bogdandy). The case studies will be Serbia and Albania which both underwent significant judicial reforms in order to conform to the EU Accession Chapters and Copenhagen criteria. The aim of the paper is to critically assess the aims but also the effects of judicial vetting in the larger context of the adherence to the values of the European Union.