JUDICIAL NATIONALISM AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF EU LAW.

The paper analyzes the current, general tendency of Constitutional Courts to claim a more intrusive review on EU Law and to hinder the direct effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. My take is that resistance to full enforcement of EU Law by national Constitutional Courts are inevitable and likely to increase in number and quality. This emerging judicial nationalism cannot be superficially dismissed as a sign of crude ignorance, but rather needs to be understood in its structural motives. Like political nationalism, judicial nationalism may assume two opposite forms: a ‘bad’, sovereignist and a ‘good’, constitutional. The former is aimed at sabotaging EU integration and the oversight carried out by EU institutions over the respect of human rights by Member States; the latter seeks to address the problems left unresolved by the yet uncompleted process of constitutionalizing Europe and to partaking in the common building of a more balanced understanding of fundamental rights.