My key theoretical contribution is in the analysis of clientelism outside election-related politics. It is about the exercise of collective judicial autonomy in clientelist authoritarian regimes. Working through these intra-judicial clientelist sub-networks allows judicial chiefs to protect their clients, provide them with “modernizing” benefits and exercise collective judicial autonomy from the rulers-patrons more generally. This is why we see many post-Soviet leaders publicly blame judicial chiefs, whose fates the former totally control, for collective recalcitrance and “corporate solidarity.” Yet the mainstream theories of judicial politics have yet to explain both blaming of and behaving of seemingly pliant judges.
Our 2020 Annual Conference was scheduled to be held at the University of Wrocław in Poland on July 9-11, 2020.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the ICON·S Executive Committee has decided to postpone our 2020 Conference to 2021. Our next Annual Conference will take place from July 8-10, 2021, in Wrocław, Poland.
Procedural details regarding the organization of the 2021 Conference will follow in the months ahead.Join ICON•S