Judicial Accountability in Brazil: A Case of Unconstitutional Ineffectiveness

Brazilian Judicial Council (BJC) dates back to 2004. A constitutional amendment on the reform of the judiciary created an institution to oversee judges and courts on administrative and budgetary matters, as also functional duties. However, the discourse on judicial independence that sided the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 outshined an effective liability. This paper aims at debating the overall role of the BJC. It proposes a case study focusing on the activity of two actors: former federal judge Sérgio Moro (the current Bolsonaro’s Minister of Justice) and present federal judge Marcelo Bretas. Their cases are instructive for they manifestly adopted political postures that should call for juridical liability. Nevertheless, several procedures that were ignited in the BJC were dismissed. The paper intends to analyze the procedures connected to Brazilian mega politics (Hirschl) in order to check when specific political positions do not call for responsibility in the BJC caselaw.