Implicit unamendability in the absence of democratic constituent power? The case of Cyprus

The aim of this paper is to scrutinize the connection between the theory of democratic constituent power and the doctrine of implicit substantive unamendability. I shall do so by criticizing the judgment of the Supreme Court of Cyprus “Michailides” (October 2020), which inaugurated the said doctrine in Cyprus without considering the fact that the constitution of Cyprus has not been, and may never become, the product of a democratic constitution-making process. Does the absence of democratic constituent power disallow the doctrine of implicit substantive unamendability? Are alternative justifications of that doctrine sufficient or do they always need to be supplemented by the notion of a sovereign, constituent people? What kind of judicial review of constitutional amendments (if any) is compatible with the democratic principle when courts and political actors are not able to take recourse to the theory of the constituent power of the people?