How does the Rule of Law survive under hyper-presidential regimes and how to strengthen it – the Colombian case

In Colombia’s recent history, is has become evident how presidential re-election – even if it is only for one additional period – has the virtue to put in risk structures of the Rule of Law; this, given the importance of the president in the institutional design of Colombia. And even though the possibility of reelection in Colombia was maintained until 2015 and partially served to conclude the peace agreement between the government and the FARC in 2016, its elimination with respect to future presidential elections in Colombia ensures to maintain the Colombian “hyper-presidentialism” in historically tolerable proportions.
But this is not sufficient. Indeed, normative powers which traditionally have been accumulated in the figure of president and which have been substantially maintained with the social and pluralist Colombian Constitution of 1991, have inhibited the strengthening of a parliamentary and participative democracy and thus the legitimacy of the Colombian State.