This paper explores the motives to include significant safeguards into the new Hungarian constitution. The first part describes the rise of Fidesz and its electoral victory in 2010, including more systematic interpretation concerning the origins of this large party system shift. The second part probes relevant theories of constitutional entrenchment and finds that there is no fundamental explanation why the constitution is drafted like it is. In conclusion, the paper disagrees with the most of present scholarship, which is considering the new Hungarian constitution to be formally within EU mainstream, while expressing concerns about Viktor Orbán’s illiberal project behind it. In contrast, I think the constitution itself is sloppily drafted, with a potential to create a dangerous crisis after Orbán’s eventual demise.
We look forward to welcoming you on July 4-6, 2022 for our Annual Conference on Global Problems and Prospects in Public Law.
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