Democratic transitions, apparent democracies and constituent power: the case of the “Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social Transitorio” in Ecuador.

This article will analyse the phenomena of democratic transitions that take place in “apparent democracies” -in which authoritarianism is exercised through an apparently democratic institutional design. I will question if taking to full force and effect a Constitution that has been used as a façade for authoritarianism is equivalent to exercising constituent power and, thus, if the acts and regulations issued by the authoritarian government -in that context- have to be regarded as public law. Ultimately, the article will question both the legal nature and normative legitimacy of the acts and regulations issued by authoritarian regimes in the context of apparent democracies. For those purposes, it will present and analyse the case of the “Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social Transitorio” in Ecuador, in which designations of public officials were revoked by a newly created transitional institution, allegedly because they were emitted by an authoritarian government.