Democratic Institutions and the Erosion of Norms: The Mexican Case

Reviewing the recent literature on the crisis of democracy and its institutions, it is common to find references to How Democracies Die by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, and to their preeminent example of the erosion of norms. In that sense, I am especially interested in revisiting the term limits, not only of elected officials, which can certainly be reelected, and even non-elected officials, such as the Justices of a Supreme Court, which can have life-appointments (as in the United States), or a mandatory age of retirement or even a fixed term of 15 years (as in Mexico before and after the constitutional reform of 1995). In addition, I would like to emphasize some recent cases including reforming the term limits of the electoral magistrates and nominating high ranking officials and even justices to the Supreme Court, who were ineligibles, but that got into office regardless of the opposition by civil society, among others.