Can we consider the constitutional pre-commitment mechanism appropriate for the defense of a constitutional theory?

In the discourse of legal constitutionalism has put forward the constitutional pre-commitment mechanism to defend the constitutional rigidy in the strong sense, under the reasons: a) the possibility of overcoming passions or interests; b) ensure efficiency or overcome strategic temporal inconsistency; c) beat the hyperbolic discount; and, d) ensure the moral or substantial reasons. However, some postulates have been defended against this approach, such as: a) the reasonable disagreements of the present and future generation; and, b) the conception of the anthropological nature of the human being of the current generation – positive understanding of the individual in the political community – and a conception of the autonomy of the political will. In this sense, under these considerations, can we consider the constitutional pre-commitment mechanism appropriate for the defense of a constitutional theory that pretends to defend constitutional rigidity in the strong sense?