Bills as a Strategic Tool in the Debate over the Independence of the Judiciary – Theory and Empirical analysis in Israel

In this paper, I will argue that in the dialogue between the Legislature and the Judiciary as to the status of the latter, bills constitute an attractive strategic tool for the Legislature. In fact, it is argued that the bills’ initiators do not necessarily intend their bills to mature into laws, as this is not always worthwhile to them, and they may use bills as a strategic “threat” to the judiciary in order for it to align as closely as possible with their position. In order to substantiate this claim, the article includes a discussion of the inherent interests of lawmakers in the independence of the judiciary. A common explanation of the Judiciary’s ability to maintain its independence is the public’s trust in the Judiciary: When the public holds the Judiciary in high esteem, an attempt to reduce its independence might motivate the public to come up against politicians who wish to undermine it And vice versa.