Anti-Discrimination Grounds as Exclusionary Reasons

The theoretical background of the different grounds of discrimination, such as race or gender, is at best vague. To remedy this insufficiency, I want to put forward a theory of anti-discrimination grounds as exclusionary reasons.
Exclusionary reasons can be traced back to Raz and are second-order reasons, which are reasons to act or not act for a reason. Applied to the different grounds of discrimination, I will argue, that these grounds are exclusionary reasons, because these grounds are generally viewed as not allowing any discrimination because of possessing a characteristic of these grounds. State authorities, such as the legislature, are, therefore, always prohibited from using differentiations based on these grounds. This makes these grounds to second-order reasons, which preclude for example the legislature when drafting a bill from basing this bill on some discriminatory grounds, such as race or gender. This paper will draft a first outline of this theory.