In 2019, the expected constitutional amendments of Egypt’s 2014 constitution were passed under a questioned public referendum and debatable legitimacy of its content. My remarks address two questions: First, why did El Sisi’s regime need constitutional amendments to consolidate its powers, despite the absence of sound opposition, and its repetitive breach of other constitutional principles with no consequences? Second, why did not the entrenchment clause protect Egypt against backsliding towards the eternal presidency? I argue that the answer to these questions lays in the constitutional politics theories more than it relates to constitutional design deficiencies, as other scholars may argue.
Our 2020 Annual Conference was scheduled to be held at the University of Wrocław in Poland on July 9-11, 2020.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the ICON·S Executive Committee has decided to postpone our 2020 Conference to 2021. Our next Annual Conference will take place from July 8-10, 2021, in Wrocław, Poland.
Procedural details regarding the organization of the 2021 Conference will follow in the months ahead.Join ICON•S