A Methodological Problem in the Construction of the Doctrine of the Control of Conventionality

The initial hypothesis of this article is that the doctrine of “Conventionality Control” was built on an incorrect theoretical basis. That doctrine fails to recognize the subsidiary role of the Inter-American bodies in relation to the states that are part of the American Convention on Human Rights.
On the one hand, I will try to demonstrate that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established itself as a supranational court, in the manner of the courts that are part of the regional integration system. I will argue that despite this theoretical framework, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has perceived itself as a supranational body that rules cases without any constitutive limitations.
Finally, I will propose a possible explanation of this phenomenon. In that sense, I will postulate that the Court has built the heart of this problematic doctrine on a first stage of “easy cases”.