A Long-Term Case for Constitutional Flexibility

21st-century constitution-making has seen constitutional amendment rules being designed more and more in a manner that favours extreme rigidity. This paper pushes for constitutional practice to take a U-turn and adopt extremely flexible amendment rules. Doing so provides long-term advantages such as (1) allowing future buy-ins, (2) permitting easy recovery from anti-democratic stresses and (3) encouraging state-building. This paper also argues how the fears of extremely flexible amendment rules are exaggerated, and these fears apply almost to the same extent to any amendment rules. Irrespective, most fears can be addressed better with certain constitutional design choices. On the other hand, moving towards the spectrum of constitutional rigidity comes with long-term trade-offs that do not apply to extremely flexible amendment rules, like intergenerational imposition, increased dependence on courts, and onerous reversibility of undesirable constitutional rules.